Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance. IHS Political Science Series: 2003, No. 87

The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance

Types of Multi-Level Governance

The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states hasdrawn attention from a growing number of scholars in the social sciences. Yet beyondagreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensusabout how it should be organized. This paper draws on several literatures to distinguish twotypes of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to a limitednumber of levels. A second type of governance conceives of a large number of functionallyspecialized, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues ofeach type of governance.multilevel governance; multilevel governance

core beliefs on EU governance

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Commission Officials and EU Governance 5 2.1 Explaining Beliefs on EU Governance 9 2.2 Beliefs about the Future 12 3\. Commission Officials and Politics 14 3.1 Understanding Ideological Variation in the Commission 15 3.2 The Meaning of the “Political“ 18 4\. Commission Officials and Policy Scope 21 4.1 Centralization Across the Board? 22 4.2 Bureau- maximization? 24 5\. Conclusion 26 References 28 Appendix: Multivariate Analyses 31What lives in the European Commission at the beginning of the 21st Century? This paper charts Commission officials’ views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy scope of the European Union, employing data from a large survey conducted in Autumn 2008. First, the Commission is not a hothouse for supranationalism. True, supporters of a supranational Union with the College of Commissioners as the government of Europe and member states in the back seat are the largest minority, but they are outnumbered two-to-one by state- centric, pragmatist, and ambivalent officials. There are striking differences in distribution by nationality, gender, and department. Second, where do Commission officials stand on ideology? The answer is that the Commission is broadly representative of European societies, at least on traditional economic left/right issues, though decidedly more socio-liberal. Ideological views are not randomly distributed across services, with social DGs significantly more social-democratic than DGs handling market integration. Officials from new member states are more market-liberal than their ‘western’ colleagues. Finally, are Commission officials indeed bureau-maximizers? We find that, on the whole, Commission officials want more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate, but their desire to centralize is selective and measured. It seems driven by functional imperatives – centralization where scale economies can be reaped – and by values and ideology rather than by a generalized preference for maximal Commission power. In short, the bureaucratic politics argument has been overstated

The European Commission in the 21st century: core beliefs on EU governance

What lives in the European Commission at the beginning of the 21st Century? This paper charts Commission officials’ views on the governance, ideological direction, and policy scope of the European Union, employing data from a large survey conducted in Autumn 2008. First, the Commission is not a hothouse for supranationalism. True, supporters of a supranational Union with the College of Commissioners as the government of Europe and member states in the back seat are the largest minority, but they are outnumbered two-to-one by state-centric, pragmatist, and ambivalent officials. There are striking differences in distribution by nationality, gender, and department. Second, where do Commission officials stand on ideology? The answer is that the Commission is broadly representative of European societies, at least on traditional economic left/right issues, though decidedly more socio-liberal. Ideological views are not randomly distributed across services, with social DGs significantly more social-democratic than DGs handling market integration. Officials from new member states are more market-liberal than their ‘western’ colleagues. Finally, are Commission officials indeed bureau-maximizers? We find that, on the whole, Commission officials want more EU authority in the eleven policy areas that we asked them to evaluate, but their desire to centralize is selective and measured. It seems driven by functional imperatives – centralization where scale economies can be reaped – and by values and ideology rather than by a generalized preference for maximal Commission power. In short, the bureaucratic politics argument has been overstated

Europe divided? Elites vs. public opinion on European integration

'Dieser Artikel vergleicht Präferenzen von europäischen Eliten, nationalen Eliten und öffentlicher Meinung hinsichtlich der Europäisierung von dreizehn Politikfeldern. Eliten sind eher bereit, nationale Autorität in Souveränitätsbereichen abzugeben, aber Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind aufgeschlossener gegenüber europäischer Sozialpolitik. Arbeiten hier kontrastierende Logiken? Die Antwort ist zweischichtig. Eliten und öffentliche Präferenzen sind sich insofern ähnlich, als sie beide am wenigsten enthusiastisch auf die Europäisierung von kostenintensiven Politikfeldern reagieren. Dies ist eine verbreitete Verteilungslogik: eine Autoritätsverschiebung könnte Eigeninteressen destabilisieren. Da der Binnenmarkt jedoch Arbeitsmarktfluktuation intensiviert, strebt die Öffentlichkeit danach, dieses Verteilungsrisiko durch selektive Europäisierung von marktflankierenden Regelungsbereichen einzudämmen. Dagegen zeigen sich die Präferenzen von Eliten konsistent mit einem funktionalen Prinzip, welches europäische Integration als die optimale Lösung für die Internalisierung von Externalitäten über den Nationalstaat hinaus versteht.' (Autorenreferat)'This article compares preferences for Europeanizing thirteen policies among European elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in sovereignty areas, but citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. Elites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could de-stabilize vested interests. However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale, which conceives European integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state.' (author's abstract)

European Integration and the State

European Commission; implementation; integration theory; multilevel governance; national interest; Nation-state; neo-functionalism; polity building; Single Market; Treaty on European Union

estimating and explaining the territorial structure of government

1\. Introduction 6 2\. Theorizing Government Structure 7 2.1 Spatial Theory 7 2.2 Soft Information Versus Scale Economies 8 3\. Estimating Government Structure 11 4\. Explaining Government Structure 17 5\. Results 18 6\. Conclusion 23 Literature 26 Appendix 30This paper suggests that the basic distinction between federal and unitary government has limited as well as served our understanding of government. The notion that variation in the structure of government is a difference of kind rather than degree has straight-jacketed attempts to estimate the authority of intermediate government. One result has been the claim that a country’s footprint, not its population, is decisive for government. Analyzing data for 39 countries since 1950, and comparing our own findings with those of alternative measurements, we find evidence for the causal effect of population. This can be theorized in terms of a trade-off between responsiveness to soft information and per capita economies in public good provision